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# **Robot Imports and Firm-Level Outcomes**

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# Robot Imports and Firm-Level Outcomes<sup>\*</sup>

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#### Abstract

We use French data over the 1994-2013 period to study how imports of industrial robots affect firm-level outcomes. Guided by a simple model, we develop a novel empirical strategy to identify the causal effects of robot adoption. Our results suggest that, while demand shocks generate a positive correlation between robot imports and employment at the firm level, exogenous exposure to automation leads to job losses. We also find that robot exposure increases labor productivity and some evidence that it may raise the relative demand for high-skill professions.

JEL Classification: J23, J24, O33, D22 Keywords: Automation, Displacement, Firms, Robots

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#### 1 INTRODUCTION

The widespread diffusion of industrial robots has fuelled growing concerns about the future of work. Robots are programmable machines with the capability to move on at least three axes. As such, unlike other pieces of equipment, they are designed to replicate human actions. The first prototype, the Unimate, was introduced in 1961 at General Motors to perform basic welding and carrying tasks. Other machines of this type were developed to assist human workers with a wide array of tasks, including heavy lifting, as well as hazardous or repetitive work, and their diffusion has grown at a staggering rate.<sup>1</sup> Industrial robots are technologies adopted by firms. To understand their effects, one must know how they affect the firms using them in the first place. Do robots substitute or complement humans in firms that automate? Are the effects heterogeneous across firms and workers? Do robots increase the productivity of firms using them? From a theoretical perspective, the answer to these questions is ambiguous. From an empirical perspective, the available evidence is worringly scarce and often limited to correlations.

This paper is one of the first attempts to fill this gap. Our main innovations are to measure automation using detailed imports of industrial robots by French manufacturing firms and to use a novel empirical strategy for identifying causality. To guide the analysis, we build a simple model in which heterogeneous firms invest in automation, whose effect is to replace workers with capital in a set of tasks. Consistent with the conventional view, the employment effect of automation is potentially ambiguous: while robots displace some workers, they also increase productivity, which raises the demand for all factors. More importantly, the model shows that demand shocks are likely to increase employment and automation simultaneously, thereby generating a positive correlation between these variables. To overcome this bias, the model also illustrates how to isolate exogenous variation in firm-level *exposure to automation* that can be used to identify causal effects.

Our empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the theory. Focusing on the manufacturing sector, where automation is more prevalent, we first find that robot adopters are larger and have a larger employment share of high-skill professions. Second, looking at the evolution of firm-level outcomes over time, we find that robot import occurs after periods of expansion in firm size, suggesting that adoption may be driven by demand

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>By 2018, there were an estimated 2.44 million industrial robots performing a variety of tasks that humans used to do. The future scale of the phenomenon is difficult to predict. Frey and Osborne (2017) argue that almost half of U.S. employment is at risk of being automated over the next two decades. See also Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) and Baldwin (2019).

shocks, but is followed by a *decline* in employment. Third, using a new measure of exposure to automation based on pre-determined technological characteristics, we find that firms that are more prone to adopt robots experience a stronger employment reduction than other firms. We also confirm that our proxy for exposure to automation is a significant predictor of robot imports. Throughout all specifications, we find that robots increase value added per worker and some evidence that they may raise the relative demand for high-skill professions.

These results suggest that demand shocks lead firms to both expand and automate, resulting in a positive correlation between robot adoption and employment. However, exogenous changes in automation lead to job displacement. Hence, they warn that caution should be exercised in interpreting the positive correlation between robot adoption and employment often found in the literature. In particular, there is a growing body of work that studies automation at the firm level. Some papers, like ours, measure automation with robot imports. These include Humlum (2019) for Denmark, Dixen, Hong and Wu (2020) for Canada, and Acemoglu, Lelarge and Restrepo (2020) for France. Other papers use dummies from survey data. These include Koch, Manuylov and Smolka (2021) for Spain, Cheng et al. (2019) for China, Dinlersoz and Wolf (2018) for the U.S., and a study by the European Commission (2015) for 7 European countries. None of these papers uses exogenous variation in automation across firms.

We are aware of two papers that try to identify causal effects using firm-level data. The first is Aghion et al. (2021), who use the same French data as us, but proxy automation with investment in industrial equipment. Employing a shift-share IV design, they find positive employment effects. As shown in our sensitivity analysis, we believe this result to be driven by the broader measure of capital inputs they consider, which is more likely to be complementary to labor. The second paper is Bessen et al. (2019), who use matched employer-employee data for the Netherlands. In line with our findings, they show that spikes in expenditure on "third-party automation services" increase job separations. Finally, our findings are consistent with Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020b) and Dauth et al. (2021), who identify the causal effects of automation across commuting zones using data from the International Federation of Robotics (IFR). By comparing firms within industries, our results reveal a new dimension of heterogeneity that cannot be observed in more aggregated data.

### 2 The Model

To guide the empirical analysis, we build a partial equilibrium model of endogenous automation across heterogeneous firms.<sup>2</sup> Consider a firm *i* facing a demand function with a constant price-elasticity,  $y_i = A_i p_i^{-\sigma}$ . Production requires a unit measure of symmetric tasks. Tasks  $z \in [0, \kappa_i]$  are automated, and thus can be performed by capital. The remaining tasks,  $z \in (\kappa_i, 1]$ , can only be performed by workers. Hence,  $\kappa_i$  represents the extent of automation. Let  $(k_i, l_i)$  denote the quantity of capital and workers, respectively, used by firm *i*. Denote with *r* the rental rate of capital and with *w* the wage of workers. We assume r < w, which implies that automated tasks are performed by capital only. Production of task *z* is:

$$x_i(z) = \begin{cases} k_i(z) & \text{for } z \in [0, \kappa_i] \\ l_i(z) & \text{for } z \in (\kappa_i, 1] \end{cases} .$$
(1)

The production function of a firm with productivity  $\varphi_i$  and automation  $\kappa_i$  is:

$$y_i = \varphi_i \exp\left(\int_0^1 \ln x_i(z) dz\right) = \varphi_i \left(\frac{k_i}{\kappa_i}\right)^{\kappa_i} \left(\frac{l_i}{1-\kappa_i}\right)^{1-\kappa_i},\tag{2}$$

where  $k_i/\kappa_i \ (l_i/(1-\kappa_i))$  is capital (workers) per task.

Firms are monopolistically competitive and choose capital, labor and automation so as to maximize profits:

$$\max_{k_i, l_i, \kappa_i} \left\{ p_i y_i - r k_i - w l_i - h f_i \left( \kappa_i \right) \right\},\,$$

where  $hf_i(\kappa_i)$  is the cost of automation, including managers and engineers, with price h. The first-order conditions for capital and labor are:

$$rk_i = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}\right)\kappa_i p_i y_i \tag{3}$$

$$wl_i = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}\right) (1 - \kappa_i) p_i y_i. \tag{4}$$

Eq. (3) shows that the demand for capital is increasing in automation,  $\kappa_i$ . Using (3)-(4) into

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Proofs are in Appendix A.1. The model adds firm heterogeneity to task-based theories of endogenous automation such as Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), Hemous and Olsen (2022), Dechezleprêtre et al. (2021), and it shares similarities with Acemoglu, Gancia and Zilibotti (2015). See, instead, Martinez (2021) for a model of automation embodied in capital goods generating a distribution of technologies.

(2) also shows that output per worker is increasing in  $\kappa_i$  if w > r, as assumed:

$$y_i = \varphi_i \frac{l_i}{1 - \kappa_i} \left(\frac{w}{r}\right)^{\kappa_i}.$$
(5)

Eq. (4) shows that automation,  $\kappa_i$ , has two opposite effects on the demand for labor. First, there is a direct negative displacement effect, given by the fact that more tasks are performed by capital. Second, as (5) shows, there is a positive productivity effect: an increase in  $\kappa_i$ raises production, which in turn increases the demand for labor. The derivative of  $l_i$  with respect to  $\kappa_i$  is:

$$\frac{d\ln l_i}{d\kappa_i} = (\sigma - 1)\ln\left(\frac{w}{r}\right) - \frac{1}{1 - \kappa_i},$$

which is positive for  $\kappa_i < 1 - [(\sigma - 1) \ln (w/r)]^{-1}$ . This condition is more likely to be satisfied when  $\sigma$  and w/r are high, i.e., when the productivity effect is strong enough. If  $\sigma$  is high, production can be scaled up without a large countervailing fall in prices; and if w/r is high, the cost saving of automation is stronger. If  $(\sigma - 1) \ln (w/r) < 1$ , instead, the displacement effect always dominates.<sup>3</sup>

Finally, consider the choice of automation,  $\kappa_i$ . We assume that automating more tasks poses an increasingly difficult challenge. For tractability, we focus on the functional form:

$$hf_i(\kappa_i) = h \frac{\rho_i}{1 - \rho_i} \left[ \left(1 - \kappa_i\right)^{-\frac{1 - \rho_i}{\rho_i}} - 1 \right],$$

with  $\rho_i \in (0,1)$ . The parameter  $1/\rho_i$  captures the rate at which the marginal cost of automation increases with  $\kappa_i$ . To see this, note that the marginal cost of automation,  $hf'_i(\kappa_i) = h (1 - \kappa_i)^{-1/\rho_i}$ , increases at a faster rate with  $\kappa_i$  the lower  $\rho_i$  is. Hence, we interpret  $\rho_i$  as an index of replaceability of tasks in the production process and we allow it to vary across firms. The first-order condition for  $\kappa_i$  is:

$$\frac{1}{1-\kappa_i} = \left[ \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}\right) \frac{p_i y_i}{h} \ln\left(\frac{w}{r}\right) \right]^{\rho_i}.$$
(6)

Larger firms (higher  $A_i$  and  $\varphi_i$ ) have a stronger incentive to pay the fixed automation cost to save on the variable production cost; automation is also increasing in the cost-saving it entails (w/r) and decreasing in its own cost h and in  $1/\rho_i$ .<sup>4</sup>

 $<sup>^{3}</sup>$ Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) allow new tasks to be created when others are automated. We abstract from this additional mechanism, which would reinforce the positive productivity effect on employment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>We show in Appendix A.3 that a variant of the model where automation is a discrete choice yields qualitatively similar results.

The model shows that the effect of  $\kappa_i$  on  $l_i$  is potentially ambiguous, so that whether or not automation raises employment is ultimately an empirical question. It also illustrates that the key empirical challenge is the endogeneity of  $\kappa_i$ . Specifically, demand shocks trigger automation but also have a direct positive effect on labor demand. A way to overcome this problem is to focus on exogenous determinants of automation that have no effects on firm outcomes other than through  $\kappa_i$ . These are the parameters capturing automation costs, namely, the industry-level cost shifter, h, and firm-level replaceability,  $\rho_i$ . However, eq. (6) shows that h and  $\rho_i$  do not operate separately: a lower automation cost has no effects on firms without replaceable tasks ( $\rho_i = 0$ ). Likewise, replaceability is immaterial in an industry where automation costs are prohibitive. Rather, h and  $\rho_i$  interact with each other (proof in Appendix A.1):

$$\frac{\partial^2 \kappa_i}{\partial \ln h \partial \rho_i} < 0. \tag{7}$$

Based on this insight, the model suggests to identify firms as more exposed to automation when they employ a larger share of replaceable workers (high  $\rho_i$ ) while operating in industries that are better suited for automation (low h).

#### 3 DATA AND PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE

Our empirical analysis uses firm-level data for France over the 1994-2013 period and combines several datasets administered by the French statistical agency (INSEE), covering the universe of French firms (legal entities) that report a complete balance sheet. For each firm, we have data on sales, material purchases, capital stock (value of physical assets) and total employment from the BRN and FARE datasets; using this information, we also compute firm-level value added. We complement the balance sheet data with information on the occupational structure of employment in each firm from DADS Etablissement. For each year, this dataset contains employment data disaggregated into five 2-digit occupations. For the year 1994, it also contains a finer employment disaggregation into 29 occupations, which we exploit when constructing our proxy for robot exposure.<sup>5</sup> For the descriptive analysis, we use the full set of years (1994-2013) while for identification we focus on the 1996-2013 period and take 1994 as a pre-sample year.

For each firm and year, we also have data on values and quantities of exports and imports for all 8-digit products of the Combined Nomenclature (CN) classification from the French

 $<sup>^{5}</sup>$ Yearly employment data for the 29 occupations are only available starting from the 2010s, and are thus missing for most of our sample period.

customs authority (DOUANE). The CN classification records trade in industrial robots into a specific product code, CN 84795000 (CN 84798950 before 1996). Accordingly, we identify firms that import robots in a given year as firms with positive imports for this product code. We also measure the stock of robot capital employed by a firm at a given point in time as the sum of robot imports by the firm up to that point.

Robot imports are recognized as a good proxy for automation because of the high concentration of this sector; see, e.g., Acemoglu and Restrepo (2022), Blanas, Gancia and Lee (2019) and Bonfiglioli et al. (2022). For instance, Japan and Germany alone account for 50% of the total volume of global exports, while France's share is about 5% only. Yet, the use of import data is subject to some limitations. On the one hand, they include imports by robot integrators or resellers, which do not represent actual instances of adoption. On the other, they do not include purchases of robots from domestic suppliers. Moreover, in the case of intra-EU transactions, firms are not required to report the list of imported products as long as their overall intra-EU imports are below a given threshold. To mitigate these issues, we restrict the sample to the manufacturing sector, where robot users are more prevalent, and drop the "Installation and Repair of Machinery and Equipment" industry. The sector of operation and the characteristics of robot importers, such as sales and size, in our final sample make it unlikely that these are just robot integrators. Although the reporting thresholds are not very high given the average price of a robot, we further restrict the analysis to firms with more than ten employees, for which the thresholds are less likely to be binding. More importantly, our identification strategy will circumvent all the limitations of import data by exploiting variation in proxies for robot exposure based on technological characteristics that are observed for all firms and not just importers.

Consistent with other studies, Appendix Figure B1 shows that robot importers are particularly frequent in the production of motor vehicles, machinery, and electrical equipment. However, robot importers are likely to be undercounted in the "Manufacture of Motor Vehicles" industry because our data lack information for the two biggest car manufacturers in France.<sup>6</sup> After removing this industry, the correlation between the number of robot importers and the stock of installed robots from the IFR is 0.79.

Our baseline sample is an unbalanced panel of 64,173 manufacturing firms, of which 765 have imported robots at least once over 1994-2013 (henceforth, "robot adopters"). This number is consistent with Acemoglu, Lelarge and Restrepo (2020), who collected information

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>For large multinational firms (e.g., Peugeot Société Anonym and Renault), INSEE reports only consolidated balance sheets of the entire group. Since the identity and composition of these groups is not constant across periods, they cannot be included for comparisons over time.

on robot adoption in France from multiple sources for the 2010-2015 period. While robot adopters are a small minority, they account for a large and growing fraction of manufacturing activity. Considering firms that are active in all years between 1994 and 2013, the shares of robot adopters in manufacturing employment and value added have increased steadily to reach 8% and 14%, respectively. This indicates that robot adopters are faring better than other manufacturing firms. Moreover, the value added share has grown significantly more than the employment share, suggesting that the expansion of robot adopters may have been accompanied by the adoption of labor-saving technologies.<sup>7</sup>

Appendix Table B1 reports summary statistics separately for robot adopters and non adopters, showing that the former firms are larger and more skill-intensive than the latter, on average. To gain further insight into the differences between the two groups of firms, we estimate conditional correlations between robot adoption and firm-level characteristics by running OLS regressions of the following form:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \alpha_{jt} + \beta \cdot Adoption_{it} + \mathbf{X}'_{it} \cdot \boldsymbol{\gamma} + \varepsilon_{it}, \tag{8}$$

where *i* denotes a firm; *j* indicates the 5-digit NACE industry in which the firm operates; and *t* stands for time.  $Y_{it}$  is an outcome and  $Adoption_{it}$  is a dummy that takes value 1 from the first year in which the firm imports robots onwards, and is equal to 0 otherwise. We control for (i) firm fixed effects,  $\alpha_i$ , to absorb time-invariant firm characteristics; (ii) 5-digit industry×year fixed effects,  $\alpha_{jt}$ , to account for differences in the industry of operation and for industry-specific shocks; and (iii) firm characteristics—log sales and dummies for firms that export or import goods other than robots—measured in the first year in which the firm is observed and interacted with a full set of year dummies,  $\mathbf{X}_{it}$ . We estimate (8) for four major outcomes that can be directly constructed from the data and on which we focus throughout the paper: (i) log sales, (ii) log employment, (iii) log value added per worker and (iv) the employment share of high-skill professions. The results are in Table 1; standard errors are corrected for clustering at the firm level and *t*-statistics are shown in square brackets. All estimates of  $\beta$  are positive and, with the exception of the regression for the employment share of high-skill workers, they are also highly statistically significant.

Do robot adopters differ from other firms already before adopting robots, or do they start diverging afterwards? To shed light on this question, we use a difference-in-differences event

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Preliminary evidence from a 2019 survey run by the U.S. Census shows similar patterns. In particular, Acemoglu et al. (2021) report that about 2% of firms use robotics for automation and these firms account for about 15% of employment.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
	Ln Sales	Ln No. of	Ln VA	Empl. Sh.	
		Employees	per Worker	High Skill	
Adoption <sub>it</sub>	0.230***	0.106***	0.057***	0.003	
	[10.458]	[5.763]	[3.630]	[1.030]	
Obs.	596,166	597,282	585,886	597,282	
R2	0.95	0.87	0.85	0.70	

Table 1: Firm-Level Outcomes, Robot Adoption and Robot Intensity

The subscripts *i* and *t* denote firms and years, respectively. The dependent variables are annual observations of the firm-level outcomes indicated in columns' headings. Value added is computed as sales minus changes in inventories minus purchases of final goods minus purchases of materials plus changes in material inventories minus other purchases. High-skill professions are scientists, managers, and engineers. *Adoption*<sub>*it*</sub> is a dummy equal to 1 for all years since the firm starts importing robots, and equal to 0 otherwise. All specifications include firm fixed effects and 5-digit industry x year fixed effects. They also control for log sales and dummies for whether the firm is an importer or an exporter; each control variable is observed in the first year in which the firm appears in the sample and is interacted with a full set of year dummies. Standard errors are corrected for clustering within firms; t-statistics are reported in square brackets. \*\*\*, \*\*, \*: denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.

study approach to analyze how the four outcomes evolve over time in robot adopters relative to other firms. We estimate the following specification:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \alpha_{jt} + \sum_{s=-5}^{-2} \beta_s \cdot D_{it}^s + \sum_{s=0}^{5} \beta_s \cdot D_{it}^s + \varepsilon_{it}, \qquad (9)$$

where  $D_{it}^s$  are event-study dummies, which are equal to 1 if firm *i* is *s* periods away from the first instance of robot imports at time *t*, and 0 otherwise. The coefficients  $\beta_s$  illustrate how a given outcome evolves over time within robot adopters relative to non adopters over a ten-year window around initial adoption (s = 0).

The results are in Figure 1 and the estimation coefficients in Appendix Table B2. Robot adoption is antedated by significant differences in the trends of sales and employment between robot adopters and non adopters. Specifically, the former firms grow faster than the latter in terms of both variables over the five-year period preceding adoption. Conversely, no clear differential pre-trend is detected in terms of value added per worker and the skill composition of the workforce. After adoption, the diverging trend in employment is reversed: while robot adopters still grow faster than non adopters, the differential gradually vanishes. Robot adopters also experience a relatively stronger shift in the skill composition of the workforce towards high-skill professions, and a faster increase in value added per worker. These results show that robot adoption occurs after periods of expansion in firm size, and is followed by employment losses, improvements in efficiency, and labor demand shifts towards high-skill



Each graph plots coefficients and confidence intervals on event-study dummies, estimated using eq. (9) for a different outcome variable (indicated in the heading of the graph). Each event-study dummy  $D_{it}^{s}$  is equal to 1 if firm *i* is *s* periods away from the first instance of robot imports at time *t* and is equal to 0 otherwise. The estimated coefficients corresponding to each graph are reported in Appendix Table B2.

Figure 1: Difference-in-Differences Event Studies

workers, with limited changes in total sales.<sup>8</sup>

### 4 The Effect of Robot Exposure

The results in Figure 1 suggest that the positive correlation between automation and employment may be spurious. We now exploit differential cross-firm variation in robot exposure stemming from pre-determined technological characteristics to identify causal effects.

#### 4.1 VARIABLES AND SPECIFICATION

Our model suggests that exposure to automation depends on the interaction between industrylevel suitability to automation and firm-level replaceability of employment. On the one hand, some industries have lower automation costs than others (low h in the model) due to the

 $<sup>^{8}</sup>$ In Appendix Figure B2, we repeat the analysis using the estimator developed by Borusyak et al. (2022) to exploit the staggered nature of adoption across firms. While this estimator fails to converge when we control for 5-digit industry×year fixed effects, a more parsimonious specification without these fixed effects delivers results qualitatively similar to those in Figure 1.

nature of their production process. This is the case of industries that use assembly lines compared to those that rely more on batch production or make customized items. On the other hand, within any given industry, firms differ in the extent to which their activities can be assigned to robots ( $\rho_i$  in the model). For example, some firms outsource the assembly stage or are specialized in complex tasks that cannot be automated. Building on these insights, our robot exposure measure, RobExp, exploits the interplay between a proxy for automation suitability in each industry, RobSuit, and a proxy for employment replaceability within each firm, Repl. With this variable, we study how robot exposure affects firm-level outcomes and adoption decisions.

In a given 5-digit industry j, we measure *RobSuit* as the average robot intensity of all firms  $i' \neq i \in j$  in the initial year, namely,

$$RobSuit_{j-i} = \sinh^{-1} \left( \frac{\sum_{i' \neq i \in j} RobStock_{i'}}{\sum_{i' \neq i \in j} CapStock_{i'}} \right), \tag{10}$$

where  $RobStock_{i'}$  and  $CapStock_{i'}$  denote firm i''s initial stocks of imported robots and total capital, respectively. Sectors with a lower cost of automation will naturally have a higher stock of robots. Normalizing it by total capital ensures that  $RobSuit_{j-i}$  is not affected by differences in scale or capital intensity and the hyperbolic sine transformation preserves the zeros.

Our replaceability measure, *Repl*, is similar to the indicator of Graetz and Michaels (2018) but is defined at the firm-level. We source from Graetz and Michaels (2018) information on whether each of 377 U.S. Census occupations is replaceable or not; an occupation is defined as replaceable if its title corresponds to at least one of the robot application categories identified by the IFR (e.g., welding, painting, assembling). We map each U.S. occupation into the 29 French occupations for which we have employment data in 1994, and construct firm-level replaceability as

$$Repl_i = \sum_{o=1}^{29} \omega_{oi} \cdot Repl_o, \tag{11}$$

where  $Repl_o$  is the replaceability of French occupation o and  $\omega_{oi}$  its share in firm *i*'s employment in 1994. The values of  $Repl_o$  are in Appendix B (Table B3), where we argue that mapping from U.S. Census occupations induces only a minimal loss of variation in  $Repl_i$  across firms. Finally, we obtain RobExp as

$$RobExp_i = RobSuit_{j-i} \cdot Repl_i.$$
<sup>(12)</sup>

Appendix Table B4 provides descriptive statistics on  $RobExp_i$  and the other variables used in this section.

We focus on long-run changes and estimate specifications of the following form:

$$\Delta Y_i = \alpha_j + \beta_1 \cdot RobExp_i + \beta_2 \cdot RobSuit_{j-i} + \beta_3 \cdot Repl_i + \mathbf{X}'_i \cdot \boldsymbol{\gamma} + \varepsilon_i, \tag{13}$$

where  $\Delta Y_i$  is the annualized change in outcome Y for firm *i* between the first and last year in which the firm is present in the sample. The use of long differences implies that identification exploits cross-sectional (across firms) variation in the pre-determined level of robot exposure and in the long-run growth of outcomes. We control for 5-digit industry fixed effects,  $\alpha_j$ , to absorb differential trends in outcomes across industries. Moreover, we control for start-ofperiod values of log firm sales and of indicators for exporting and importing firms, included in the vector  $\mathbf{X}_i$ . While firms with high and low replaceability are comparable in terms of these characteristics in the first year (Appendix Table B5), it is possible that initially larger and more trade-oriented firms will follow different paths in terms of adoption and outcomes in subsequent periods; controlling for  $\mathbf{X}_i$  absorbs possible heterogeneous trends across firms within the same industry. We correct the standard errors for clustering within 5-digit industries to account for possibly correlated shocks among firms within industries.<sup>9</sup>

As suggested by the model (eq. 7), we believe that neither  $Repl_i$  nor  $RobSuit_{j-i}$  alone fully captures a firm's exposure to robots. For instance, replaceability of employment cannot trigger automation in industries where robots are not available. Recognizing this, our empirical approach goes beyond the level effect of these variables and focuses instead on their interaction in a difference-in-differences specification. Moreover, while  $Repl_i$  and  $RobSuit_{j-i}$ are pre-determined and thus do not respond to subsequent changes in firm-level outcomes, they could still be correlated with other firm or industry variables affecting outcomes. Being identified by both firm- and industry-level variation, the interaction coefficients  $\beta_1$  are less likely to be confounded by omitted firm or industry characteristics than the linear components.

 $<sup>^{9}</sup>$ We winsorize the change in each outcome at the top and bottom 5% of the distribution to prevent results from being driven by extreme observations.

#### 4.2 BASELINE RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

The baseline estimates of  $\beta_1$  are in Table 2, panel a). The change in each outcome is multiplied by 100 to express it in percentages.<sup>10</sup> The full list of coefficients is in Appendix Table B7. The coefficient on  $RobExp_i$  is negative and precisely estimated in the employment regression, indicating that more robot exposed firms experience a relatively larger and statistically significant reduction in employment over the sample period. As for the other outcomes,  $\beta_1$  is positive and precisely estimated in the regression for value added per worker, suggesting that higher robot exposure may induce efficiency gains within firms. The effect of robot exposure on sales, albeit positive, is not statistically significant. This suggests that productivity gains need not always translate into lower prices. Finally, the results point towards a positive, albeit imprecisely estimated, effect of robot exposure on the skill structure of employment. As for the other regressors, Appendix Table B7 shows that the coefficient on  $Repl_i$  generally has the same sign as that on our preferred measure of robot exposure,  $RobExp_i$ .<sup>11</sup>

Our working hypothesis is that robot exposure affects outcomes by inducing firms to adopt robots. In column (5), we study this mechanism by estimating (13) with a different dependent variable,  $Adopter_i$ , a dummy equal to 1 for firms that start importing robots over the sample period. The coefficient on  $RobExp_i$  is positive and very precisely estimated, implying that firms that are more exposed to robots do indeed show a greater tendency to adopt robots in subsequent years. We refrain from interpreting these estimates as the first stage in a 2SLS framework because  $Adopter_i$  only captures the extensive margin of automation and is driven by a small number of firms. Reassuringly, Appendix Table B8 shows that robot exposure is also associated with an increase in robot intensity (stock of robot capital over total capital stock) among adopters.

The estimates in Table 2 imply that a change in automation suitability equal to the interquartile range of its distribution (12.12) is associated with a 67% higher adoption probability and an employment fall of 0.36 percentage points (p.p.) per year in firms at the 75th percentile of the replaceability distribution (0.52) relative to firms at the 25th percentile (0.20). As an example, the firm with average replaceability in the "Manufacture of Parts

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>In Appendix Table B6, we estimate (13) replacing  $RobExp_i$ ,  $RobSuit_{j-i}$  and  $Repl_i$  with a dummy for firms that adopt robots over the sample period. Consistent with our preliminary evidence, these firms experience a relatively larger increase in size and value added per worker, and a somewhat faster shift in labor demand towards high-skill workers.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Appendix Table B8 also reports small and insignificant effects of  $RobExp_i$  on the labor share of value added. As we show in Appendix A.2, this result is consistent with the model if the automation cost is in terms of high-skill workers.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	$\Delta$ Ln Sales	$\Delta$ Ln No. of Employees	Δ Ln VA per Worker	∆ Empl. Sh. High Skill	Adopter
		a	) Baseline Regree	ssions	
RobExp <sub>i</sub>	0.148	-0.094**	0.302***	0.006	0.174***
	[1.343]	[-2.095]	[2.702]	[1.106]	[2.893]
Obs.	36,301	36,584	35,180	36,584	36,584
R2	0.10	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.05
		b)	Weighted Regre	essions	
RobExp <sub>i</sub>	0.142	-0.108**	0.310***	0.008	0.224***
	[1.192]	[-2.230]	[2.629]	[1.396]	[2.666]
Obs.	36,301	36,584	35,180	36,584	36,584
R2	0.10	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.07
		c) Excluding	Manufacturing	of Motor Vehicle	es
RobExp <sub>i</sub>	0.148	-0.095**	0.303***	0.005	0.171***
	[1.329]	[-2.101]	[2.695]	[0.837]	[2.847]
Obs.	35,759	36,040	34,647	36,040	36,040
R2	0.10	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.05
		d) Broad	er Definition of R	Robot Imports	
RobExp <sub>i</sub>	0.127	-0.038	0.187*	0.010**	0.261*
	[1.314]	[-0.810]	[1.768]	[2.096]	[1.830]
Obs.	36,301	36,584	35,180	36,584	36,584
R2	0.10	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.11
		e) Intera	ctions with Dema	and Elasticity	
RobExp <sub>i</sub>	-0.160	-0.203**	-0.061	0.001	0.065
	[-0.737]	[-2.020]	[-0.270]	[0.111]	[0.414]
$RobExp_i \ x \ Elast_h$	0.069*	0.023	0.076*	0.002	0.023
	[1.963]	[1.405]	[1.955]	[0.774]	[0.838]
Obs.	32,427	32,679	31,365	32,679	32,679
R2	0.11	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.05
		f) Alternative	e Proxy for Robot	t Exposure (IFR	.)
$RobExp_i$	3.331***	0.248	3.537***	0.070**	0.625***
	[9.669]	[1.043]	[11.543]	[2.537]	[3.469]
Obs.	36,301	36,584	35,180	36,584	36,584
R2	0.10	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.05

Table 2: Firm-Level Outcomes and Robot Exposure, Main Results and Robustness

The subscript *i* denotes firms. In columns (1)-(4), the dependent variables are 100 x the annualized changes in the firm-level outcomes indicated in columns' headings. In columns (5), the dependent variable is *Adopter*<sub>i</sub>, a dummy equal to 1 for firms that start importing robots over the sample period and equal to 0 for non importers. With the exception of panel f),  $RobExp_i$  is the product between the initial firm-level replaceability of employment by robots ( $Repl_i$ ) and the initial ratio between the overall stock of robots and the total capital stock of all other firms in each 5-digit industry *j* ( $RobSuit_{ji}$ ). In panel f),  $RobExp_i$  is constructed by replacing  $RobSuit_{ji}$  with the log stock of installed robots in each firm's sector in the U.S., based on data from the International Federation of Robotics (IFR) for 13 manufacturing sectors. The regressions in panel b) are weighted by the initial number of employees in each firm. The sample in panel c) excludes firms in the "Manufacture of Motor Vehicles" industry. In panel d), robot imports include CN codes 842489, 842890, 851580, 847950, 851531, 851521 and 848640. In panel e),  $Elast_b$  is the elasticity of demand, defined at the 3-digit sector level, *b*; the specification also includes interactions of  $Elast_b$  with  $Repl_i$  and  $RobSuit_{ji}$  (coefficients unreported). All regressions also include the linear terms in  $Repl_i$  and  $RobSuit_{ji}$ , initial values of log sales and of dummies for importing and exporting firms, and 5-digit industry fixed effects. Standard errors are corrected for clustering within 5-digit industries; t-statistics are reported in square brackets. \*\*\*, \*\*, denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.

and Accessories for Motor Vehicles" industry (high suitability) would have a 56% higher adoption probability and experience a 0.30 p.p. per year employment fall relative to the firm with average replaceability in the "Manufacture of Wine from Grape" industry (low suitability). Moreover, the average increase in  $RobSuit_{j-i}$  over 1994-2013 (8.55) would induce a 48% higher adoption probability and a 0.26 p.p. per year employment fall at the 75th percentile of the replaceability distribution relative to the 25th percentile.

The remaining panels of Table 2 contain an extensive sensitivity analysis. In panel b), we weigh the observations by each firm's initial number of employees. In panel c), we further exclude firms in the "Manufacture of Motor Vehicles" industry. The results are largely unchanged. In panel d), we extend the definition of automation suitability to include all types of machinery designed for lifting, handling, loading, unloading and welding. Robot exposure no longer has a statistically significant effect on employment but induces a stronger shift in labor demand towards high-skill professions. These results are consistent with the finding in Aghion et al. (2021) that broader forms of capital equipment are more complementary to labor.

The model predicts that in industries where demand is more elastic, the productivity effect of automation should be stronger because firms can scale up production without large reductions in prices (Bessen, 2019). We therefore extend (13) by interacting  $RobExp_i$ ,  $Repl_i$ , and  $RobSuit_{j-i}$  with the elasticity of substitution in each sector (Broda and Weinstein, 2006). The results confirm that robot exposure causes a relatively larger increase in sales in sectors where products are more substitutable (panel e)). Similarly, it has a relatively less negative employment effect in sectors where demand is more elastic, although the interaction coefficient is marginally insignificant. The effect of robot exposure on value added per worker is also relatively stronger in sectors where products are more substitutable.

Finally, we use an alternative proxy for robot exposure obtained by replacing  $RobSuit_{j-i}$  with the log initial stock of installed robots in each firm's sector in the U.S., sourced from the IFR. This variable includes domestically sourced robots and, being based on U.S. rather than French data, may be more exogenous. However, the IFR data are only available for 13 aggregate manufacturing sectors, so variation is much more limited. The coefficient on  $RobExp_i$  in the employment regression is not statistically significant, though the coefficient on  $Repl_i$  alone remains strongly negative (not reported). The effect of  $RobExp_i$  on all other outcomes, including now sales, are strongly positive. These results suggest that the IFR sectors may be too coarse to dispel the concern of correlations with positive shocks.

#### 4.3 THREATS TO IDENTIFICATION

We now discuss the main threats to identification. A first concern is that the fixed effects and controls in (13) might not fully account for heterogeneous trends across firms. In Table 3, we thus augment (13) with additional covariates and fixed effects, and study how the coefficient on  $RobExp_i$  is affected. In panel a), we add each firm's initial employment share of high-skill workers and capital-labor ratio. Initial differences in skill and capital intensities may reflect various factors leading to heterogeneous trends, such as differences in production organization, product quality and firms' stage within the life cycle. Yet, these controls do not significantly alter our main findings.

Despite our highly disaggregated industry fixed effects, some differences might persist in the types of goods produced by firms within an industry. For the sub-sample of exporting firms, the customs data provide us with the full list of exported products according to the highly detailed CN classification. In panel b), we thus focus on firms that export goods at least once, and include a fixed effect for each firm's main export product (by total export value) at the CN 6-digit level, along with a dummy for multi-product exporters. Accordingly, we compare firms that export similar goods within an industry and control for productspecific trends. The main results are preserved in this very demanding specification.

Differences in initial characteristics may give rise to heterogeneous trends also by introducing variation in the quality of imported robots or by influencing firms' decisions to source robots from domestic integrators rather than foreign suppliers. In a first exercise, we leverage again our rich customs data augmenting the specification with the average unit value of imported robots as a proxy for their quality (panel c)). In a second exercise, we re-estimate (13) on firms that never import robots (panel d)). This is possible because our robot exposure variable,  $RobExp_i$ , is defined for all firms, not just for importers. Our evidence is confirmed in both cases. In panel e), we interact  $RobExp_i$ ,  $Repl_i$ , and  $RobSuit_{j-i}$  with  $Adopter_i$ ; consistent with panel d), all coefficients on the  $RobExp_i \times Adopter_i$  interaction are statistically insignificant.

A second identification concern is that, even after accounting for fixed effects and covariates,  $RobExp_i$  might be correlated with omitted variables that impact outcomes. Since  $RobExp_i$  is the interaction between  $Repl_i$  and  $RobSuit_{j-i}$ , two cases pose threats to identification: (i) if  $Repl_i$  is correlated with other firm characteristics that differentially affect outcomes across industries with varying levels of automation suitability; and (ii) if  $RobSuit_{j-i}$ captures other industry characteristics that heterogeneously affect outcomes across firms

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Δ Ln Sales	$\Delta$ Ln No. of	$\Delta$ Ln VA per	$\Delta$ Empl. Sh.	Adopter
		Employees	Worker	High Skill	
		a) Controls for	Initial Skill and	Capital Intensit	ies
$RobExp_i$	0.124	-0.092**	0.263**	0.004	0.184***
	[1.186]	[-2.015]	[2.505]	[0.494]	[2.939]
Obs.	35,747	36,023	34,663	36,023	36,023
R2	0.10	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.05
	b) Expo	rted Products Fig	xed Effects, Sub	-Sample of Expo	orting Firms
RobExp <sub>i</sub>	0.033	-0.143***	0.254***	0.009	0.241***
	[0.384]	[-2.689]	[2.620]	[1.291]	[3.817]
Obs.	27,534	27,758	26,515	27,758	28,761
R2	0.21	0.15	0.16	0.14	0.16
		c) Control f	or Average Rob	ot Import Price	
RobExp <sub>i</sub>	0.148	-0.095**	0.303***	0.006	0.164***
	[1.349]	[-2.104]	[2.707]	[1.106]	[3.575]
Obs.	36,301	36,584	35,180	36,584	36,584
R2	0.10	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.79
		d) Sub-Sa	mple of Non Ro	bot Adopters	
RobExp <sub>i</sub>	0.153	-0.094**	0.310***	0.008	-
	[1.366]	[-2.034]	[2.752]	[1.246]	-
Obs.	35,729	36,008	34,633	36,008	-
R2	0.10	0.04	0.07	0.04	-
		e) Robot Ad	opters vs. Non 1	Robot Adopters	
RobExp <sub>i</sub>	0.146	-0.095**	0.306***	0.007	-
	[1.319]	[-2.101]	[2.734]	[1.162]	-
$RobExp_i x Adopter_i$	-0.184	-0.131	-0.243	-0.015	-
	[-1.176]	[-0.893]	[-1.472]	[-0.883]	-
Obs.	36,301	36,584	35,180	36,584	-
R2	0.10	0.04	0.07	0.04	-

Table 3: Threats to Identification: Additional Controls and Alternative Samples

The subscript i denotes firms. In columns (1)-(4), the dependent variables are 100 x the annualized changes in the firmlevel outcomes indicated in columns' headings. In columns (5), the dependent variable is Adopter i, a dummy equal to 1 for firms that start importing robots over the sample period and equal to 0 for non importers.  $R_{\theta} Exp_{i}$  is the product between the initial firm-level replaceability of employment by robots  $(Repl_i)$  and the initial ratio between the overall stock of robots and the total capital stock of all other firms in each 5-digit industry / (RobSuiti,). The specification in panel a) includes the initial skill intensity (employment share of high-skill workers) and the initial capital intensity (capital-to-labor ratio) of each firm. The specification in panel b) is estimated on the sub-sample of firms that export goods at least once over the sample period and includes both a fixed effect for each firm's main export product (by total export value) at the CN 6-digit level and an indicator variable for multi-product exporters. The specification in panel c) includes the average unit value of imported robots (hyperbolic sine transformation). The sample used in panel d) consists of firms that do not import robots over the sample period. The specification in panel e) also includes the interactions of Repl<sub>i</sub> and RobSuit<sub>ji</sub> with Adopter i (coefficients unreported). Column (5) is missing in panels d) and e) because the dependent variable, Adopter i is always zero (one) among non robot adopters (adopters). All regressions also include the linear terms in Repli and RobSuiti, initial values of log sales and of dummies for importing and exporting firms, and 5-digit industry fixed effects. Standard errors are corrected for clustering within 5-digit industries; t-statistics are reported in square brackets. \*\*\*, \*\*: denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.

with different degrees of replaceability. We now extend the specification by adding interactions of  $Repl_i$  and  $RobSuit_{j-i}$  with some of the most plausible confounders, and study how this influences the coefficient on  $RobExp_i$ .

In Table 4, panel a), we interact  $RobSuit_{j-i}$  with each firm's routine intensity—the share of routine-intensive occupations in total employment in 1994. We construct this variable by mapping Autor and Dorn's (2013) data on occupational routine intensity to the 29 French occupations; the linear term in routine intensity is included but untabulated. While routine intensity is correlated with the adoption of skill-intensive technologies such as computers (e.g., Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003), Cheng et al. (2019) find that robots are more prevalent at firms where employees commonly perform manual rather than routine tasks. Consistently, the new interaction has no significant effect on robot adoption, and its inclusion leaves the evidence on  $RobExp_i$  unaffected. In panel b), we add interactions between  $RobSuit_{j-i}$  and all the control variables in  $\mathbf{X}_i$ . Consistent with size and trade orientation being comparable across firms with high and low replaceability (Appendix Table B5), the main results are preserved. Similarly, panel c) shows that the results are unchanged when controlling for the interaction between each variable in  $\mathbf{X}_i$  and  $Repl_i$ .

Next, we consider the possibility that  $Repl_i$  interacts with industry characteristics other than  $RobSuit_{j-i}$ . In panel d), we add interactions between  $Repl_i$  and: (i) total imports and exports; (ii) average unit values of imports and exports; and (iii) imports of capital and technology goods. We construct these variables in the initial year by aggregating across firms other than *i* in each 5-digit industry. These characteristics also enter the specification linearly. The coefficients on  $RobExp_i$  remain close to the baseline estimates. Finally, we add interactions between  $Repl_i$  and 2-digit sector dummies (panel e)). Contributing to the identification of  $\beta_1$  is now only the remaining variation in  $RobSuit_{j-i}$  across narrow (5-digit) industries within the same 2-digit sector. Our main results are unchanged.

#### 5 CONCLUSIONS

We have studied the effects of industrial robots using data for French firms between 1994 and 2013. Our results suggest that, while robot adopters are growing in employment relative to other firms, exogenous exposure to automation leads to significant job losses. There is also some evidence that automation may increase the relative demand for high-skill professions. These results are important because the normative literature has shown that automation may call for corrective measures if it displaces workers and/or increases inequality (e.g., Beraja

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Δ Ln Sales	$\Delta$ Ln No. of	$\Delta$ Ln VA per	$\Delta$ Empl. Sh.	Adopter
		Employees	Worker	High Skill	
	a) 1	Interaction of Ro	bot Suitability w	vith Routine Inte	ensity
RobExp <sub>i</sub>	0.151	-0.090**	0.297***	0.006	0.181***
	[1.385]	[-1.994]	[2.676]	[1.005]	[3.055]
$RobSuit_{j-i} \ge Routine_i$	-2.934	4.864	9.589	1.193***	2.545
	[-0.129]	[0.829]	[0.433]	[2.781]	[0.355]
Obs.	36,301	36,584	35,180	36,584	36,584
R2	0.10	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.05
	b) In	teractions of Rol	bot Suitability wi	ith Firm Charact	teristics
RobExp <sub>i</sub>	0.137	-0.091**	0.283**	0.007	0.167***
	[1.260]	[-2.006]	[2.564]	[1.174]	[2.730]
Obs.	36,301	36,584	35,180	36,584	36,584
R2	0.10	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.05
	<b>c)</b> I	nteractions of Re	eplaceability with	h Firm Characte	ristics
RobExp <sub>i</sub>	0.148	-0.095**	0.304**	0.008	0.169***
	[1.245]	[-2.070]	[2.534]	[1.286]	[2.906]
Obs.	36,301	36,584	35,180	36,584	36,584
R2	0.10	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.05
	d) Int	eractions of Rep	laceability with	Industry Charac	teristics
RobExp <sub>i</sub>	0.173	-0.137***	0.399***	0.012*	0.136**
	[1.591]	[-2.771]	[3.969]	[1.795]	[2.252]
Obs.	36,254	36,537	35,134	36,537	36,903
R2	0.10	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.05
	e)	Interactions of	Replaceability w	ith Sector Dumr	nies
RobExp <sub>i</sub>	0.155	-0.089*	0.306***	0.006	0.175***
	[1.353]	[-1.934]	[2.620]	[0.968]	[2.853]
Obs.	36,301	36,584	35,180	36,584	36,584
R2	0.10	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.05

Table 4: Firm-Level Outcomes and Robot Exposure, Threats to Identification

The subscripts *i* and *j* denote firms and 5-digit industries, respectively. In columns (1)-(4), the dependent variables are 100 x the annualized changes in the firm-level outcomes indicated in columns' headings. In columns (5), the dependent variable is  $Adopter_i$ , a dummy equal to 1 for firms that start importing robots over the sample period and equal to 0 for non importers.  $RobExp_i$  is the product between the initial firm-level employment share of occupations that can be replaced by robots  $(Repl_i)$  and the initial ratio between the overall stock of robots and the total capital stock of all other firms in each 5-digit industry *j*  $(RobSuit_{ji})$ . In panel a),  $Routine_i$  is the initial firm-level employment share of routine-intensive occupations; the specification also includes the linear term in  $Routine_i$  (coefficient unreported). The specifications in panels b) and c) include interactions of  $RobSuit_{ji}$  and  $Repl_i$ , respectively, with the initial values of log sales and of dummies for importing and exporting firms. The specification in panel d) includes the initial values of sectoral exports and imports, export and import unit values, capital goods and technology goods imports, as well as the interactions of these variables with  $Repl_i$ . The specification in panel e) includes interactions of  $Repl_i$  with a full set of 2-digit sector dummies. All regressions also include the linear terms in  $Repl_i$  and  $RobSuit_{ji}$ , initial values of log sales and of unmies for importing firms, and 5-digit industry fixed effects. Standard errors are corrected for clustering within 5-digit industries; t-statistics are reported in square brackets. \*\*\*, \*\*, \*: denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.

and Zorzi, 2022, Costinot and Werning, 2018, Thuemmel, 2018, and Guerreiro, Rebelo, and Teles, 2022). We also view them as a building block in studying the macroeconomic effects of automation (e.g., Moll, Rachel and Restrepo, 2022). While we have focused attention to firms that use robots, so as to shed light on the micro adjustment, it would be interesting to study what happens to other firms in the same industry. Robot adoption is likely to induce a reallocation away from non adopters, with further negative effects on employment. Estimating these industry-level effects seems an important avenue for future research.<sup>12</sup> We have also found that, while robot adoption increases labor productivity, its effect on sales is weaker. This suggests that the efficiency gains may be partly offset by an increase in markups. Since automation is prevalent among top firms, investigating its relationship with market power seems another important avenue for future research.

 $<sup>^{12}</sup>$ See Hubmer and Restrepo (2022), Acemoglu, Lelarge and Restrepo (2020) and Koch, Manuylov and Smolka (2021) for some evidence on this reallocation.

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#### MODEL А

#### A.1 DERIVATIONS AND PROOFS

Using (5) into (4) yields:

$$l_i = w^{-\sigma} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \right)^{\sigma} A_i \varphi_i^{\sigma - 1} \left( \frac{w}{r} \right)^{\kappa_i(\sigma - 1)} \left( 1 - \kappa_i \right).$$
(A1)

This equation shows how employment depends on  $\kappa_i$  and other exogenous parameters, and can be used to compute  $\frac{d \ln l_i}{d\kappa_i}$ . Substituting (A1) in (5) we can express output as a function of automation and other

exogenous parameters:

$$y_i = A_i \varphi_i^{\sigma} w^{-\sigma} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \right)^{\sigma} \left( \frac{w}{r} \right)^{\kappa_i \sigma}.$$
 (A2)

This equation confirms that automation raises output as long as capital is cheaper than production workers:

$$\frac{d\ln y_i}{d\kappa_i} = \sigma \ln\left(\frac{w}{r}\right),\tag{A3}$$

and it illustrates that the productivty effect is stronger in industries where demand is more elastic  $(\sigma)$ .

Consider now the choice of automation. Firms choose the level of  $\kappa_i$  that maximizes profits:

$$\max_{\kappa_{i}}\left\{\frac{p_{i}y_{i}}{\sigma}-hf_{i}\left(\kappa_{i}\right)\right\}.$$

The first-order condition for  $\kappa_i$  is:

$$\left(1-\frac{1}{\sigma}\right)p_iy_i\ln\left(\frac{w}{r}\right) = hf'_i(\kappa_i).$$

Using  $y_i = A_i p_i^{-\sigma}$ , (A2) and  $hf'_i(\kappa_i) = h (1 - \kappa_i)^{-1/\rho_i}$  yields:

$$\left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}\right)^{\sigma} A_i \left(\frac{\varphi_i}{w}\right)^{(\sigma-1)} \left(\frac{w}{r}\right)^{\kappa_i(\sigma-1)} \ln\left(\frac{w}{r}\right) = h \left(1 - \kappa_i\right)^{-1/\rho_i}.$$
(A4)

This expression shows the exogenous determinants of the marginal benefit of automation and can be used to solve implicitly for the equilibrium level of  $\kappa_i$ . The second-order condition is necessarily satisfied if  $(\sigma - 1) \ln (w/r) < 1/\rho_i$  and the unique solution is interior if:

$$\left(1-\frac{1}{\sigma}\right)^{\sigma}A_i\left(\frac{\varphi_i}{w}\right)^{(\sigma-1)}\ln\left(\frac{w}{r}\right) > h.$$

We assume both conditions to be satisfied. Denote the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of automation as  $MB_i$  and  $MC_i$ , respectively. Then:

$$\frac{\partial MB_i}{\partial \kappa_i} = MB_i \times (\sigma - 1) \ln\left(\frac{w}{r}\right)$$
$$\frac{\partial MC_i}{\partial \kappa_i} = \frac{MC_i}{\rho_i (1 - \kappa_i)}.$$

Under the assumption  $(\sigma - 1) \ln \left(\frac{w}{r}\right) < 1/\rho_i$ , profits are concave in  $\kappa_i$  so that:

$$\frac{\partial MB_i}{\partial \kappa_i} < \frac{\partial MC_i}{\partial \kappa_i}.$$

We now derive the comparative statics for the optimal level of automation,  $\kappa_i^*$ , with respect to the primitives of the model and prove that:

$$\frac{d\kappa_i^*}{dA_i} > 0; \quad \frac{d\kappa_i^*}{d\varphi_i} > 0; \quad \frac{d\kappa_i^*}{d(w/r)} > 0; \quad \frac{d\kappa_i^*}{d\rho_i} > 0 \quad ; \quad \frac{d\kappa_i^*}{dh} < 0.$$

Differentiating the first-order condition, we obtain the implicit derivative of  $\kappa_i^*$  with respect to any parameter v as

$$\frac{d\kappa_i^*}{dv} = \frac{\frac{\partial MC}{\partial v} - \frac{\partial MB}{\partial v}}{\frac{\partial MB}{\partial \kappa_i} - \frac{\partial MC}{\partial \kappa_i}}.$$

The denominator is always negative. Hence, to find the sign of the derivatives of interest, we just need to compute the numerator of the expression above for  $A_i$ ,  $\varphi_i$ , (w/r),  $\rho_i$  and h as follows:

$$\begin{split} \frac{\partial MC}{\partial A_i} &- \frac{\partial MB}{\partial A_i} &= -\frac{MB}{A_i} < 0 \rightarrow \frac{d\kappa_i^*}{dA_i} > 0 \\ \frac{\partial MC}{\partial \varphi_i} &- \frac{\partial MB}{\partial \varphi_i} &= -(\sigma - 1) \frac{MB}{\varphi_i} < 0 \rightarrow \frac{d\kappa_i^*}{d\varphi_i} > 0 \\ \frac{\partial MC}{\partial (w/r)} &- \frac{\partial MB}{\partial (w/r)} &= -\frac{MB}{(w/r)} \left[ \kappa_i \left( \sigma - 1 \right) + \frac{1}{\ln \left( w/r \right)} \right] < 0 \rightarrow \frac{d\kappa_i^*}{d(w/r)} > 0 \\ \frac{\partial MC}{\partial \rho_i} &- \frac{\partial MB}{\partial \rho_i} &= \frac{h}{\rho_i^2} \frac{\ln \left( 1 - \kappa_i \right)}{(1 - \kappa_i)^{1/\rho_i}} < 0 \rightarrow \frac{d\kappa_i^*}{d\rho_i} > 0 \\ \frac{\partial MC}{\partial h} &- \frac{\partial MB}{\partial h} &= \frac{MC}{h} > 0 \rightarrow \frac{d\kappa_i^*}{dh} < 0. \end{split}$$

Implicit differentiation of (A4) yields:

$$\frac{d\kappa_i}{d\ln h} = \frac{-1}{\rho_i^{-1}(1-\kappa_i)^{-1} - (\sigma-1)\ln(w/r)} < 0$$

and

$$\frac{\partial^2 \kappa_i}{\partial \rho_i \partial \ln h} = \frac{\kappa_i - 1}{\left[1 - (1 - \kappa_i)(1 - \sigma)\rho_i \ln (w/r)\right]^2} < 0.$$

Hence, a decrease in the cost of automation h triggers automation more in firms with higher replaceability.

#### A.2 Implications for the Labor Share

We now study the effect of automation on the labor share. Recall that automation affects the demand for production workers but also for managers and engineers (non-production workers). Assuming that the cost of automation is in terms of non-production workers, the overall labor share, denoted by  $\lambda_i$ , is then:

$$\lambda_i \equiv \frac{wl_i + hf\left(\kappa_i, \rho_i\right)}{p_i y_i} = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}\right)\left(1 - \kappa_i\right) + \frac{h}{p_i y_i} \frac{\rho_i}{1 - \rho_i} \left[\left(1 - \kappa_i\right)^{-\frac{1 - \rho_i}{\rho_i}} - 1\right].$$

An increase in  $\kappa_i$  lowers the revenue share of production workers (the first term) but raises the share of non-production workers (the second term). As a result, the overall effect on the labor share is ambiguous. To see this, use  $h/(p_i y_i)$  from the first-order condition for  $\kappa_i$  to express  $\lambda_i$  as a function of  $\kappa_i$  and exogenous parameters only:

$$\lambda_i = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}\right) \left[ \left(1 - \kappa_i\right) + \ln\left(\frac{w}{r}\right) \frac{\rho_i}{1 - \rho_i} \left[1 - \kappa_i - \left(1 - \kappa_i\right)^{1/\rho_i}\right] \right]$$

Then compute:

$$\frac{d\lambda_i}{d\kappa_i} = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}\right) \left[-1 + \ln\left(\frac{w}{r}\right) \frac{1}{1 - \rho_i} \left[(1 - \kappa_i)^{\frac{1}{\rho_i} - 1} - \rho_i\right]\right].$$

The labor share is decreasing in automation if  $\kappa_i$  is sufficiently high:

$$\kappa_i > 1 - \left[\frac{1-\rho_i}{\ln\left(w/r\right)} + \rho_i\right]^{\frac{1-\rho_i}{\rho_i}}$$

However, at low levels of  $\kappa_i$ , the labor share may increase with automation.

#### A.3 DISCRETE CHOICE OF AUTOMATION

We now consider the case in which firm *i* can choose whether to keep the current level of automation  $\kappa_0$  at no additional cost or increase it to  $\kappa_1 > \kappa_0$ , subject to the cost  $\frac{h\kappa_1}{\rho_i}$ . The discrete choice problem facing firm *i* is

$$\max_{\kappa_{i}\in\{\kappa_{0},\kappa_{1}\}}\left\{\frac{p_{i}\left(\kappa_{i}\right)y_{i}\left(\kappa_{i}\right)}{\sigma}-hf_{i}\left(\kappa_{i}\right)\right\}.$$

The condition for i to choose  $\kappa_1$  is

$$\frac{p_{i}(\kappa_{1}) y_{i}(\kappa_{1}) - p_{i}(\kappa_{0}) y_{i}(\kappa_{0})}{\sigma} > \frac{h\kappa_{1}}{\rho_{i}},$$

which, after using  $y_i = A_i p_i^{-\sigma}$  and (A2), becomes

$$\frac{A_i}{\sigma} \left[ \varphi^{\sigma} w^{-\sigma} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \right)^{\sigma} \right]^{1 - 1/\sigma} \left[ \left( \frac{w}{r} \right)^{\kappa_1 \sigma} - \left( \frac{w}{r} \right)^{\kappa_0 \sigma} \right]^{1 - 1/\sigma} > \frac{h \kappa_1}{\rho_i}.$$

The left-hand side captures the benefit of further automation, while the right-hand side corresponds to its cost.

In this case, we can express the comparative statics in terms of the probability that an increase in any parameter induces a switch from  $\kappa_0$  to  $\kappa_1$ . In particular, we are interested in the effect of an increase in (w/r) and its interaction with  $A_i$ ,  $\varphi_i$  and  $\rho_i$ . It is easy to show that the left-hand side, denoted by  $B_i$ , is increasing in (w/r):

$$\frac{\partial B_i}{\partial \left(\frac{w}{r}\right)} = \frac{\left(\sigma - 1\right)A_i}{\sigma} \left[\varphi_i^{\sigma} w^{-\sigma} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}\right)^{\sigma}\right]^{1 - 1/\sigma} \frac{\left[\kappa_1 \left(\frac{w}{r}\right)^{\kappa_1 \sigma - 1} - \kappa_0 \left(\frac{w}{r}\right)^{\kappa_0 \sigma - 1}\right]}{\left[\left(\frac{w}{r}\right)^{\kappa_1 \sigma} - \left(\frac{w}{r}\right)^{\kappa_0 \sigma}\right]^{1/\sigma}} > 0.$$

This means that increasing automation is more likely to be optimal for lower relative cost of capital (r/w).

To characterize the interaction with  $A_i$  and  $\varphi_i$ , we compute the cross derivatives of  $B_i$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial^2 B_i}{\partial \left(\frac{w}{r}\right) \partial A_i} &= \frac{\partial B_i}{\partial \left(\frac{w}{r}\right)} A_i^{-1} > 0, \\ \frac{\partial^2 B_i}{\partial \left(\frac{w}{r}\right) \partial \varphi_i} &= \frac{\partial B_i}{\partial \left(\frac{w}{r}\right)} \sigma \varphi_i^{-1} > 0, \end{aligned}$$

which imply that the likelihood of further automation increases more with (w/r) for larger and more productive firms.

The derivative of the automation cost with respect to  $\rho_i$ ,

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \rho_i} \left( \frac{h\kappa_1}{\rho_i} \right) = -\frac{h\kappa_1}{\rho_i^2} < 0,$$

suggests that an increase in (w/r) increases more the likelihood of further automation for firms with higher replaceability  $\rho_i$ , since these face a lower cost.

	Robot Adopters						
	Obs.	No. Firms	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	Mean Δ	
						(annualized)	
Adoption	6,373	765	1	1	1	0	
No. of Employees	6,373	765	852	191	3,129	-0.016	
Empl. Sh. High Skill	6,373	765	0.153	0.108	0.142	0.006	
Sales (€'000)	6,373	765	761,597	46,050	6,812,860	-0.075	
VA per Worker (€'000)	6,225	761	178	65	2,715	-0.070	
Dummy Importer	6,373	765	0.972	1	0.164	0.001	
Dummy Exporter	6,373	765	0.947	1	0.224	0.002	
	Non Robot Adopters						
Adoption	598,925	63,408	0	0	0	0	
No. of Employees	598,925	63,448	78	27	313	-0.030	
Empl. Sh. High Skill	598,925	63,448	0.081	0.056	0.106	0.003	
Sales (€'000)	598,922	63,448	54,703	7,615	683,130	-0.092	
VA per Worker (€'000)	587,342	62,741	190	71	1,973	-0.066	
Dummy Importer	598,925	63,448	0.568	1	0.495	0.001	
Dummy Exporter	598,925	63,448	0.561	1	0.496	0.004	

Table B1: Descriptive Statistics, Whole Sample

The whole sample consists of all manufacturing firms with more than 10 employees excluding firms in the "Installation and Repair of Machinery and Equipment" industry (64,173 firms). *Adoption* is a dummy taking value 1 since the first year in which a firm imports robots. *Importer* and *Exporter* are dummies taking value 1 if the firm imports (resp. exports) goods other than robots in a given year and 0 otherwise. Value added is computed as sales minus changes in inventories minus purchases of final goods minus purchases of materials plus changes in material inventories minus other purchases. High-skill professions are scientists, managers, and engineers. All statistics are computed on firm-level observations for the 1994-2013 period. Changes are computed as annualized log differences, except for *Employment Sh. High Skill*, *Exporter* and *Importer* dummies, for which annualized changes in levels are reported.

#### **B** Additional Empirical Results

Table B1 contains summary statistics on the firm-level variables, separately for firms that import robots at least once over 1994-2013 ("robot adopters") and for firms that do not ("non robot adopters"). The statistics are computed on the whole sample, comprising 64,173 manufacturing firms, of which 765 are robot adopters. The average robot adopter is around 11 times larger than the average non adopter in terms of employment and around 14 times larger in terms of sales. The skill composition of employment also differs between robot adopters and non adopters, with the employment share of high-skill professions roughly twice as high on average in the former group of firms than in the latter. Robot adopters are also more likely to import and export goods other than robots.

Table B1 also reports the average annualized change in each variable over 1994-2013, separately for the two sets of firms. While employment decreased in both groups of firms, robot adopters shed workers at a slower rate than non adopters (0.016 vs. 0.03 log points per year, respectively).<sup>13</sup> Robot adopters also experienced a relatively slower reduction in sales and a relatively faster increase in the employment share of high-skill professions. As for the sectoral distribution of robot adopters, Figure B1 shows that these firms are present in all 2-digit manufacturing sectors but are particularly frequent in the production of motor

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>Manufacturing employment significantly declined in France during the sample period.



Figure B1: Cumulative Number of French Robot Importers by Sector (1994-2013)

vehicles, machinery, and electrical equipment.

Table B2 contains the estimation coefficients corresponding to the difference-in-differences event studies shown in Figure 1. Figure B2 presents instead the results from difference-indifferences event studies that exploit the staggered nature of adoption across firms, using the approach developed by Borusyak et al. (2022); 5-digit industry×year fixed effects are excluded in this case due to convergence issues. Despite the use of a more parsimonious specification, the qualitative evidence is similar to that emerging from Figure 1. Pre-trends in employment and sales clearly violate the parallel trends assumption.

Table B3 lists the 29 French occupations for which we have employment data in 1994, along with their replaceability level,  $Repl_o$ . The latter is the aritmethic mean of the Graetz and Michaels (2018) replaceability indicator across all U.S. Census occupations associated with each French occupation o. As expected, unskilled industrial workers are the most replaceable occupation, with a value of  $Repl_o$  equal to 0.70. Among the remaining occupations, a few have very low levels of replaceability and the majority are not replaceable at all. This pattern implies that the loss of variation in replaceability that results from mapping the detailed 377 U.S. occupations to the broader 29 French occupations ends up being minimal. To have a sense of this, we exploit individual-level data from the 1990 U.S. Census of Population (Ruggles et al., 2023) to compute average replaceability within 459 4-digit NACE industries, using replaceability data at both levels of occupational detail (377 U.S. occupations and the 29 French occupations corresponding to them according to our mapping). For each industry, average replaceability is calculated as the weighted mean of replaceability across occupations, with weights given by their shares in the total number of hours worked in the industry. The resulting measures of industry-level replaceability exhibit a very high correlation coefficient, equal to 0.93 across the 459 industries. This suggests that the cross-firm variation in replaceability,  $Repl_i$ , would not be largely different if our data allowed us to use the finer occupational classification available for the U.S..

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Ln Sales	Ln No. of	Ln VA	Empl. Sh.
		Employees	per Worker	High Skill
$\mathrm{D}^{-5}_{it}$	-0.153***	-0.090***	-0.015	-0.006**
	[-4.679]	[-3.851]	[-0.517]	[-2.399]
$\mathrm{D}^{-4}_{it}$	-0.087***	-0.075***	0.036	-0.004
	[-3.610]	[-3.382]	[1.273]	[-1.539]
$D_{it}^{-3}$	-0.063***	-0.023	0.007	-0.005**
	[-3.117]	[-1.293]	[0.284]	[-2.255]
$D_{it}^{-2}$	-0.042**	-0.018	-0.005	-0.002
	[-2.126]	[-1.157]	[-0.229]	[-1.440]
$\mathbf{D}_{it}^{0}$	0.051***	0.031	0.003	-0.000
	[2.805]	[1.601]	[0.116]	[-0.129]
$D_{it}^1$	0.060***	0.037*	-0.014	0.003
	[2.682]	[1.842]	[-0.579]	[1.230]
$D_{it}^2$	0.046*	-0.000	0.019	0.006**
	[1.812]	[-0.005]	[0.652]	[2.211]
$D_{it}^{3}$	0.051*	-0.039	0.066**	0.011***
	[1.912]	[-1.366]	[2.091]	[3.159]
$D^4_{it}$	0.037	-0.053	0.058*	0.012***
	[1.320]	[-1.534]	[1.698]	[2.789]
$D_{it}^{5}$	0.060*	-0.037	0.058*	0.007
	[1.958]	[-1.169]	[1.855]	[1.583]
Obs.	689,846	593,312	581,715	593,312
R2	0.93	0.88	0.82	0.67

Table B2: Difference-in-Differences Event Studies

The subscripts *i* and *t* denote firms and years, respectively. The dependent variables are annual observations at time *t* of the firm-level outcomes indicated in columns' headings.  $D_{it}^{s}$  are event-study dummies, which are equal to 1 if firm *i* is *s* periods away from the first instance of robot imports at time *t* and are equal to 0 otherwise. All specifications include firm fixed effects and 5-digit industry x year fixed effect. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity; t-statistics are reported in square brackets. \*\*\*, \*\*, \*: denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.



Each graph plots coefficients and confidence intervals on event-study dummies, obtained by estimating eq. (9) using the approach developed by Borusyak et al. (2022). Each event-study dummy  $D_{it}^{s}$  is equal to 1 if firm *i* is *s* periods away from the first instance of robot imports at time *t* and is equal to 0 otherwise. The specification excludes 5-digit industry x year fixed effects due to convergence issues.

#### Figure B2: Difference-in-Differences Event Studies, Staggered Adoption

Table B4 contains descriptive statistics for the variables used in the long-differences specifications. Both replaceability,  $Repl_i$ , and robot exposure,  $RobExp_i$ , are higher on average for robot adopters. Employment, sales and value added per worker have decreased less among robot adopters than among other firms, and robot adopters have experienced a relatively larger increase in the employment share of high-skill professions. Table B5 reports summary statistics on the start-of-period values of firm characteristics, separately for firms with  $Repl_i$ above or below the sample median. The table suggests that firms with high and low levels of replaceability are largely comparable in terms of these variables.

The differences in outcomes between robot adopters and other firms documented in Table B4 persist even after controlling for initial characteristics of the firm and its industry of operation. Specifically, Table B6 reports estimates of (13), in which  $RobExp_i$ ,  $RobSuit_{j-i}$  and  $Repl_i$  are replaced with a dummy,  $Adopter_i$ , which takes value 1 if firm *i* starts importing robots over the sample period, and is equal to 0 both for non-adopters and for firms that were already using robots initially. The control variables are 5-digit industry fixed effects and initial values of log sales and of dummies for importing and exporting firms. The standard errors are corrected for clustering within 5-digit industries to account for possibly correlated shocks among firms in the same industry. The coefficients on  $Adopter_i$  reflect cross-sectional

differences in the growth of outcomes between robot adopters and other firms. The results show that firms that adopt robots over the sample period experience a relatively larger increase in size and value added per worker, and a somewhat faster shift in labor demand towards high-skill labor.

Table B7 contains the full list of estimated coefficients from the baseline specifications reported in panel a) of Table 2. Consistent with Graetz and Michaels (2018), the coefficient on the linear term in  $Repl_i$  generally has the same sign as that on our preferred measure of robot exposure,  $RobExp_i$ , implying that firms with higher initial replaceability adopt more robots, and experience larger increases in value added per worker and larger employment reductions, in subsequent years. Finally, Table B8 shows the baseline estimates of (13) and the main robustness checks using two additional firm-level outcomes, namely, the labor share (odd-numbered columns) and robot intensity (even-numbered columns). The labor share is the ratio between wage bill and total sales net of raw material purchases. Robot intensity is the ratio between the stock of robot capital and the total capital stock; the stock of robot capital is constructed as the sum of robot imports over time. The specifications for robot intensity are estimated on the sub-sample of robot adopters. The coefficient on  $RobExp_i$  is small and statistically not significant across all specifications for the labor share. This results is consistent with the model if the cost of automation is in terms of high-skill workers, as shown in Appendix A.2. On the contrary, the coefficient on  $RobExp_i$  is positive and precisely estimated in all specifications for robot intensity. This suggests that a higher robot exposure is associated not only with a greater tendency to adopt robots (as documented in the text) but also with a more intensive use of robots in production.

Occupation	Replo
Farmers (employees of their own farm)	0.000
Artisans (employees of their own business)	0.071
Merchants and similar professions (employees of their own business)	0.000
Business owners with 10 or more employees (employees of their own business)	0.000
Liberal professions (practiced under an employee status)	0.000
Public sector executives	0.000
Teachers, scientific professions	0.000
Information, arts, and entertainment professions	0.000
Administrative and commercial executives in companies	0.000
Engineers and technical executives in companies	0.000
Primary school teachers and similar professions	0.000
Intermediate healthcare and social work professions	0.000
Clergy, religious professionals	0.000
Intermediate administrative professions in the public sector	0.100
Intermediate administrative and commercial professions in companies	0.000
Technicians (excluding tertiary technicians)	0.000
Foremen, supervisory staff (excluding administrative supervisory roles)	0.000
Civil employees and service agents in the public sector	0.000
Surveillance agents	0.000
Administrative employees in companies	0.000
Commercial employees	0.000
Direct services to individuals personnel	0.100
Skilled industrial workers	0.375
Skilled artisanal workers	0.250
Drivers	0.000
Skilled handling, warehousing, and transportation workers	0.000
Unskilled industrial workers	0.705
Unskilled artisanal workers	0.233
Agricultural and related workers	0.000

Table B3: Replaceability of French Occupations

 $R\phi l_{\theta}$  is the aritmethic mean of the Graetz and Michaels (2018) replaceability indicator across all U.S. Census occupations corresponding to each French occupation  $\theta$ .

		Robot Ado	pters			
	Obs.	Mean	Median	Std. Dev		
$\Delta$ Ln No. of Employees	497	-0.009	0.003	0.077		
$\Delta$ Empl. Sh. High Skill	497	0.005	0.003	0.009		
$\Delta$ Ln Sales	493	-0.093	-0.081	0.093		
$\Delta$ Ln VA per Worker	470	-0.096	-0.094	0.095		
$\Delta$ Labor Share	497	0.001	-0.001	0.019		
$\Delta$ Robot Intensity	481	0.041	0.006	0.134		
Average Robot Import Price (HST)	497	4.911	4.764	1.590		
Ln Initial Sales	497	11.778	11.644	1.768		
Ln Initial Skill Intensity	497	0.102	0.070	0.104		
Ln Initial Capital Intensity	491	-12.603	-12.748	1.144		
Dummy Initial Importer	497	0.924	1.000	0.260		
Dummy Initial Exporter	497	0.889	1.000	0.314		
Replaceability	497	0.378	0.416	0.183		
Robot Exposure	497	-5.872	-5.330	3.730		
	Non Robot Adopters					
$\Delta$ Ln No. of Employees	36,087	-0.033	-0.012	0.095		
$\Delta$ Empl. Sh. High Skill	36,087	0.003	0.001	0.011		
$\Delta$ Ln Sales	35,808	-0.132	-0.108	0.13		
$\Delta$ Ln VA per Worker	34,710	-0.104	-0.101	0.142		
$\Delta$ Labor Share	36,087	0.003	0.001	0.031		
$\Delta$ Robot Intensity	35,532	0.000	0.000	0.000		
Average Robot Import Price (HST)	36,087	0.010	0.000	0.233		
Ln Initial Sales	36,087	9.882	9.686	1.370		
Ln Initial Skill Intensity	37,087	0.064	0.046	0.081		
Ln Initial Capital Intensity	35,532	-11.819	-11.908	1.15		
Dummy Initial Importer	36,087	0.550	1.000	0.498		
Dummy Initial Exporter	36,087	0.519	1.000	0.500		
Replaceability	36,087	0.358	0.360	0.190		
Robot Exposure	36,087	-6.681	-5.946	4.300		

Table B4: Descriptive Statistics, Sample Used for Specifications in Long Differences

The sample for specifications in long differences consists of 36,584 manufacturing firms with more than 10 employees excluding firms in the "Installation and Repair of Machinery and Equipment" industry. *Labor Share* is the ratio between wage bill and total sales net of raw material purchases. *Robot Intensity* is the ratio between stock of robot capital and total capital stock; the stock of robot capital is constructed as the sum of robot imports over time. *Average Robot Import Price* is the average unit value of imported robots, transformed using the hyperbolic sine transformation (HST). *Skill Intensity* and *Capital Intensity* are the employment share of high-skill workers and the capital-to-labor ratio, respectively. *Robot Exposure* is the product between the initial firm-level replaceability of employment by robots (*Replaceability*) and the initial ratio between the overall stock of robots and the total capital stock of all other firms in each 5-digit industry (*Robot Suitability*).

	Firms with Below-Median Replaceability				
	Obs.	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	
Replaceability	18,292	0.195	0.203	0.102	
Ln Initial Sales	18,292	9.790	9.544	1.451	
Ln Initial Skill Intensity	18,292	0.079	0.057	0.101	
Ln Initial Capital Intensity	18,046	-11.714	-11.783	1.181	
Dummy Initial Importer	18,292	0.511	1.000	0.500	
Dummy Initial Exporter	18,292	0.491	0.000	0.500	
	Firms wi	th Above-Medi	an Replaceabi	llity	
Replaceability	18,292	0.521	0.523	0.091	
Ln Initial Sales	18,292	10.025	9.858	1.337	
Ln Initial Skill Intensity	18,292	0.048	0.039	0.053	
Ln Initial Capital Intensity	17,977	-11.945	-12.055	1.127	
Dummy Initial Importer	18,292	0.600	1.000	0.490	
Dummy Initial Exporter	18,292	0.558	1.000	0.497	

Table B5: Descriptive Statistics on Initial Firm Characteristics by Level of Replaceability

The sample is the one used for specifications in long differences and consists of 36,584 manufacturing firms with more than 10 employees excluding firms in the "Installation and Repair of Machinery and Equipment" industry. Statistics are reported separately for firms with *Replaceability* above or below the sample median.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	$\Delta$ Ln Sales	$\Delta$ Ln No. of Employees	$\Delta$ Ln VA per Worker	$\Delta$ Empl. Sh. High Skill
Adopter <sub>i</sub>	4.438***	2.434***	1.517***	0.007
	[11.032]	[7.775]	[3.609]	[0.155]
Obs.	36,301	36,584	35,180	36,584
R2	0.10	0.04	0.06	0.04

Table B6: Firm-Level Outcomes and Robot Adoption, Long Differences

The subscript *i* denotes firms. In each regression, the dependent variable is 100 x the annualized change in the firm-level outcome indicated in the corresponding column. *Adopter*<sub>i</sub> is a dummy equal to 1 for firms that start importing robots over the sample period and equal to 0 for non importers. All specifications include 5-digit industry fixed effects as well as initial values of log sales and of dummies for importing and exporting firms. Standard errors are corrected for clustering within 5-digit industries; t-statistics are reported in square brackets. \*\*\*, \*\*, \*: denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	$\Delta$ Ln Sales	$\Delta$ Ln No. of Employees	$\Delta$ Ln VA per Worker	Δ Empl. Sh. High Skill	Adopter
$RobExp_i$	0.148	-0.094**	0.302***	0.006	0.174***
	[1.343]	[-2.095]	[2.702]	[1.106]	[2.893]
Repl <sub>i</sub>	0.193	-3.798***	4.595**	-0.139	3.379***
	[0.092]	[-4.698]	[2.246]	[-1.230]	[2.660]
RobSuit <sub>j-i</sub>	0.974	-65.304***	23.771	16.035***	5.147
	[0.016]	[-5.018]	[0.352]	[11.205]	[0.362]
Ln Initial Sales <sub>i</sub>	-1.271***	-0.015	-1.199***	0.072***	1.349***
	[-10.145]	[-0.268]	[-9.353]	[10.298]	[7.275]
Dummy Initial Importer <sub>i</sub>	1.073***	0.040	1.087***	0.049**	-0.076
	[4.720]	[0.297]	[5.496]	[2.395]	[-0.477]
Dummy Initial Exporter <sub>i</sub>	0.436**	-0.403***	0.746***	0.059***	0.014
	[2.214]	[-2.963]	[3.658]	[3.206]	[0.118]
Obs.	36,301	36,584	35,180	36,584	36,584
R2	0.10	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.05

Table B7: Firm-Level Outcomes and Robot Exposure, Baseline Regressions

The subscript *i* denotes firms. In columns (1)-(4), the dependent variables are 100 x the annualized changes in the firm-level outcomes indicated in columns' headings. In columns (5), the dependent variable is *Adopter*<sub>i</sub>, a dummy equal to 1 for firms that start importing robots over the sample period and equal to 0 for non importers.  $RobExp_i$  is the product between the initial firm-level replaceability of employment by robots ( $Repl_i$ ) and the initial ratio between the overall stock of robots and the total capital stock of all other firms in each 5-digit industry *j* ( $RobSuit_{ji}$ ). The other regressors are the initial values of *Ln Sales* and of the *Importer* and *Exporter* dummies. All regressions also include 5-digit industry fixed effects. Standard errors are corrected for clustering within 5-digit industries; t-statistics are reported in square brackets. \*\*\*, \*\*, \*: denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	$\Delta$ Labor	$\Delta$ Robot	$\Delta$ Labor	$\Delta$ Robot	$\Delta$ Labor	$\Delta$ Robot
	Share	Intensity	Share	Intensity	Share	Intensity
	a) Baseline	Regressions	b) Weighted Regressions		c) Excl. Manuf. of Motor Vehic	
$RobExp_i$	0.009	0.726**	0.008	0.577**	0.008	0.748**
	[1.148]	[2.132]	[0.906]	[2.106]	[1.027]	[2.181]
Obs.	36,584	481	36,584	481	36,040	475
R2	0.02	0.18	0.03	0.16	0.03	0.18

Table B8: Additional Firm-Level Outcomes and Robot Exposure

The subscript *i* denotes firms. In each regression, the dependent variable is 100 x the annualized change in the firm-level outcome indicated in the corresponding column. The sample used in columns (2), (4) and (6) consists of firms that start importing robots over the sample period.  $RobExp_i$  is the product between the initial firm-level replaceability of employment by robots ( $Repl_i$ ) and the initial ratio between the overall stock of robots and the total capital stock of all other firms in each 5-digit industry *j* ( $RobSuit_{ji}$ ). The regressions in panel b) are weighted by the initial number of employees in each firm. The sample in panel c) excludes firms in the "Manufacture of Motor Vehicles" industry. All regressions also include the linear terms in  $Repl_i$  and  $RobSuit_{ji}$ , initial values of log sales and of dummies for importing and exporting firms, and 5-digit industry fixed effects. Standard errors are corrected for clustering within 5-digit industries; t-statistics are reported in square brackets. \*\*\*, \*\*, \*: denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.